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21 October 1960

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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



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
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DAILY BRIEF

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II. ASIA-AFRICA

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Britain-Uganda London will refuse Buganda's formal request for separate independence from the Uganda protectorate by early 1961. The request for independence, made on 4 October, followed the Buganda legislature's passage of a resolution

last month declaring that Uganda would not participate in Uganda protectorate affairs. The British are determined to keep the protectorate intact, however, and are prepared to alter the Uganda government and, if necessary, even replace the present ruler, who has considerable popular support. Present British plans for the protectorate call for independence by about 1963.

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(Page 3) (Map)

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
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III. THE WEST

Cuba: The Castro regime, which on 18 October requested the UN General Assembly to consider its charges of US aggression, may now be preparing to stage another "incident" to back up such accusations. The American Embassy, which has received several reports that five or six Cuban planes at the major air base south of Havana have been

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painted with US insignia, believes these aircraft might be used in such a move. The Castro regime has used such tactics before, notably last March when it hired two Americans to stage a flight to Cuba and then used the flight to "prove" US complicity with Cuban "war criminals." The UN General Assembly's Disarmament Committee will probably take up the Cuban request early next week; Castro himself may return to the UN to press his charges, either there or in plenary session.

*An official of the Cuban Embassy in Ottawa told an American Embassy officer there on 19 October that he believes the Castro regime will respond to the imposition of new US restrictions on exports to Cuba by breaking diplomatic relations.

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LATE ITEM

*USSR: Khrushchev's speech in Moscow on 20 October, ostensibly a report on his activities at the United Nations, was in reality a vigorous defense of his estimate of the international situation and his general foreign policy line in recent years. Khrushchev's principal purpose probably was to reiterate his views in the strongest possible terms in preparation for the meeting of world Communist leaders in Moscow next month. The speech contained no evidence that any progress has been achieved in reducing the areas of disagreement with the Chinese Communists; on the contrary, Khrushchev pointedly rejected the policy of "adventurers" who think the "social order" can be changed by war. The Soviet premier repeated his New York proposals for reorganizing the United Nations structure, and implied that the Security Council should be enlarged by adding such neutralist powers as India and Indonesia as permanent members. He also repeated the warning

[redacted] that the Berlin question "must be solved in 1961."

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Impending Political Crisis in Uganda

London will refuse Buganda's formal request for independence separate from the Uganda protectorate by early 1961 and is prepared to take firm action to handle the political crisis this decision will precipitate. The 4 October independence request followed the Buganda legislature's passage of a resolution last month declaring that Buganda, the protectorate's largest and richest province, would not participate in Uganda affairs. The British are determined to keep the protectorate intact, and are prepared to alter the Buganda government and, if necessary, even replace the present ruler--or Kabaka--who has considerable popular support.

Fearful of losing their influence, the traditional rulers of Buganda have long opposed British efforts to introduce more responsible government on a protectorate-wide basis. Discussions in London between the Kabaka and Colonial Secretary Macleod were suspended in mid-September after London refused to promise that Uganda's new constitution to be drafted in mid-1961 would guarantee Buganda special rights in a weak Uganda federation.

While not opposed to some degree of federalism, London is determined to push constitutional reform to prepare Uganda for independence as a single state. British officials in Uganda have set some time between 1963 or 1964 as a target date for independence, with the proviso that "outside pressure" could advance this by about six months. These officials are recommending that Britain try to undercut Buganda's opposition by lobbying at the UN, with the argument that Buganda's desires are undemocratic and not in keeping with the "wind of change." Although only one percent of the Buganda electorate has so far registered, London is determined to proceed with protectorate-wide elections in February or March for members of the legislature.

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Khrushchev Reports on UN Activities

Khrushchev's speech in Moscow on 20 October, ostensibly a report on his UN venture, was in reality a vigorous defense and justification of his estimate of the international situation and his general foreign policy course in recent years. Using the disarmament issue as the basis for his remarks, Khrushchev presented a strong indictment of the positions taken by the Chinese Communists, specifically rejecting the views of "adventurers" who believe that the social order should be changed by "unleashing wars." In contrast, Khrushchev endeavored to draw a picture of the international situation as sharply divided into three power groupings, with future international alignment of the neutralist states at stake. In effect, he claimed that only by a combination of propaganda, agitation, and diplomatic activities, as typified in his UN performance, would the bloc isolate and defeat the West by winning over these uncommitted states.

The detailed manner in which Khrushchev developed his position on the points at issue with the Chinese Communists provides further evidence that no progress has been achieved in reducing the areas of disagreement. The speech was, therefore, probably intended to present the strongest and most convincing case for Soviet views and serve as a preview for the Communist world of the position the Kremlin will take in the forthcoming meeting of Communist parties in Moscow. Khrushchev's determination to undercut Chinese criticism of his policies in dealing with the "national liberation struggle" was also reflected in the pains he took to reiterate his de facto recognition of and support for the Algerian rebels. He described the Algerian situation as a "just war"--the type which "we support"--and warned that if the French "colonialists" do not leave Algeria they will be forced out in a "military debacle."

On the issues which Khrushchev raised at the UN, he advanced claims of maximum success. Elaborating on the question of reorganizing the UN, he asserted that his attendance at the meeting was not only worthwhile but necessary in order to present the "fundamental proposition" that the present structure of

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the UN is obsolete and must be modified to reflect the actual balance of power in the world. He added that the UN could not expect future Soviet respect for its decisions until a reorganization had been effected in the Security Council, the executive organs, and the office of the Secretary General.

On East-West questions Khrushchev is apparently setting the stage for a possible bloc walkout for the UN Political Committee's discussion of disarmament to be followed by a campaign for a special UN session attended by the heads of government next March or April. He also repeated his warning, [REDACTED] that the Berlin question "must be solved in 1961." However, he reaffirmed his pledge to stand by his post-summit commitment to seek a new summit meeting before taking unilateral action, provided Bonn did not engage in further "provocations." In the USSR's first authoritative response to Bonn's denunciation of the interzonal trade agreement, he warned that East Germany would be forced to reply to further provocations with economic measures. [REDACTED]

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Executive Offices of the White House

Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

Scientific Adviser to the President

Director of the Budget

Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization

Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Special Assistant for Security Operations Coordination

Chairman, Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities

Special Assistant for Foreign Economic Policy

Executive Secretary, National Security Council

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration

The Counselor

Director, International Cooperation Administration

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

The Director, The Joint Staff

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

Assistant to Secretary of Defense for Special Operations

Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

The Department of Commerce

The Secretary of Commerce

Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

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The Director

National Intelligence Center

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